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TAX SALES OF REAL
ESTATE-INADEQUATE
CONSIDERATION NO
LONGER GROUNDS FOR
INVALIDATION
Powell v. County of St. Louis1
Mr. and Mrs. Roy Powell and their Powell Land Company owned 207
tracts of land in St. Louis County on which the taxes had not been paid for
more than three years. To enforce the collection of these back taxes, the
lots were offered at a Jones-Munger tax sale by the County in 1970 and
1971, but no bid was accepted at either offering and no sale was consummated. The lands were offered again in 1972 and collector's deeds were executed to the highest bidder, the Director of Revenue of St. Louis County,
who was acting as trustee for the County. Subsequently the Powells
brought an action to cancel the collector's deeds and to quiet title in
themselves. They contended that the notice of sale was defective in that it
incompletely stated the statutory basis of the sale, 2 and that the consideration given for the lots was so grossly inadequate as to constitute fraud and
1. 559 S.W.2d 189 (Mo. En Banc 1977).
2. The court summarily rejected the plaintiffs' first contention by noting
that since there was no requirement that the statutory basis of the sale be mentioned in the published notice, an incomplete reference thereto could not render
the notice defective. 559 S.W.2d at 190-91. The Powells might have had better
luck challenging the constitutional sufficiency of notice by publication, as provided for by the statute. Although earlier cases held notice by publication sufficient
in tax sale cases, see Longyear v. Toolan, 209 U.S. 414 (1908); Leigh v. Green,
193 U.S. 79 (1904); Spitcaufsky v. Hatten, 353 Mo. 94, 182 S.W.2d 86 (En Banc
1944); Kennen v. McFarling, 350 Mo. 180, 165 S.W.2d 681 (1942), these cases
may be overruled by the due process requirements enunciated in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950)(holding notice by publication to trust beneficiaries whose names and addresses were known insufficient).
Several state supreme courts, following Mullane, have found notice by publication of tax sales constitutionally defective. See, e.g., Pierce v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 200 Kan. 74, 434 P.2d 858 (1967); Dow v. State, 396 Mich. 192, 240
N.W.2d 450 (1976); Town of Montville v. Block 69, Lot 10, 74 N.J. 1, 376 A.2d
909 (1977) (good presentation of both sides of issue in majority and dissent). Recent challenges of Missouri tax sale notice provisions, however, have been decided
without reaching the constitutional question. See Coon v. Teasdale, 567 F.2d 820
(8th Cir. 1977) (federal jurisdiction barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1341, which restricts
federal power to restrain state tax collection); Collector of Revenue v. Parcels of
Land, 566 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. En Banc 1978) (defendant had actual notice and
hence lacked standing; dictum that Mullane may be controlling). Cf. Nelson,
ConstitutionalProblems with Power of Sale Foreclosure: A JudicalDilemma,
43 MO. L. REv. 25, 26-30 (1978) (examining similar issues in the area of mortPublished
by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1979
gages).
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render the collector's deeds void. 3 The trial court entered judgment for the
defendant County of St. Louis and the plaintiffs appealed. The Missouri
Court of Appeals determined that the law in this area needed reexamination and the case was transferred to the Supreme Court of Missouri. Affirming the judgment of the trial court, the Missouri Supreme Court held
that inadequacy of consideration is not, by itself, a ground for setting aside
tax sales and deeds, and thereby overruled a large body of prior case law.
In rendering this decision, the court examined the logic and history of
the previous Missouri rule which allowed tax sales conducted under the
Jones-Munger law4 to be set aside solely because of inadequate consideration. In order to clarify the court's reasoning in overturning this rule, it will
be helpful to outline briefly the relevant procedures prescribed by the
Jones-Munger law.
When taxes on land in Missouri become delinquent, a lien arises which
the county collector is required to enforce.5 The procedure for enforcement is a public sale of the land held on the fourth Monday in August in
the first year in which the tax is delinquent. 6 At prescribed intervals before
the public sale date the collector must publish a newspaper notice of sale
containing certain required information. 7 If no amount bid at the first offering is equal to or greater than the taxes due plus interest, penalties, and
costs, then no sale is made and the land is offered for sale again the next
year." If no amount bid at this second offering is equal to such amounts
due, the land is offered a third time in the following year and sold to the
highest bidder regardless of the size of his bid. 9 A trustee appointed by the
taxing authority is allowed to bid at the third sale, but not in excess of the
sum of taxes, interest, penalties, and costs. 10 The owner of the land may
3. Although the facts do not make clear what relation the sale price bore to
the actual value of the lots, one can infer that it was probably no more than 10%.
559 S.W.2d at 193.
4. RSMO § 140.010 (1978). Several other provisions deal with the rather
complex system of classification of Missouri counties and cities. RSMO §§ 48.020,
72.010-.040 (1978). Important sections include: §§ 141.010-.200 (class one
counties); §§ 141.820-.970 (City of St. Louis); §§ 93.015-.385 (first class cities); §§
93.390-.565 (second class cities); §§ 94.010-.180 (third class cities); and §§
94.190-.330 (fourth class cities).
5. RSMO § 140.010 (1978). The delinquent taxes create only a lien, imposing no personal liability on the landowner. Id. § 140.640. See also State ex rel.
Leachmen v. Matoushek, 471 S.W. 2d 686, 687 (St. L. Mo. App. 1971) (circuit
court lacks jurisdiction to render personal judgment for real estate taxes).
6. RSMo § 140.150 (1978).
7. Id. MO. CONST. art. 10, § 13 (1945) requires that in non-judicial real
estate tax sale proceedings, such as Jones-Munger sales, the notice of sale contain
the names either of all record owners or of all owners appearing in the land tax
book.
8. RSMo § 140.240 (1978).
9. Id. § 140.250.
10. Id. § 140.260. The trustee holds title "for the benefit of all funds entitled
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss4/12
to participate in the taxes against all such lands or lots so sold." Id. The trustee
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remove the tax lien at any time before sale by paying the collector the taxes
and interest due."1 If the land was sold at the first or second offering, he
may within two years after the sale redeem the land by paying the purchaser an amount equal to the taxes, interest, penalties, and costs, plus
any subsquent taxes. 12 And, although there is no such automatic right of
redemption from sales made at the third offering,'" specific grounds for
setting aside collector's deeds are enumerated. 14 The statute provides for a
special bar of actions to invalidate collector's deeds if not brought within
three years after the deed is recorded. Is In any event, the 6owner is entitled
to recover any surplus sale proceeds from the collector.'
The Powell court's decision, holding that tax sales and deeds cannot
be cancelled solely for inadequacy of consideration, had two main purposes: to enhance tax title marketability in order to stimulate sale bidding and thereby improve tax collection;' 7 and to enforce the JonesMunger law as written and purportedly intended.' In so holding, the
does not actually pay for the land; the deed issued to him merely recites the
amount of delinquency. Subsection 1 makes it clear that the purpose of this section is to protect the taxing authorities from loss resulting from sales where no
private bids will satisfy the tax debt. The land is held for later negotiated resale,
at which time, presumably a higher price can be received.
11. RSMO § 140.110 (1978). This section makes no mention of penalties or
costs. The owner discharges the lien by paying taxes and interest "at the rate
specified in § 140.100." Id. Apparently, this must refer to what is denominated a
"penalty" in § 140.100(1), since that section do es not mention interest.
12. RSMo § 140.340 (1978).
13. Id. § 140.250.
14. Id. § 140.610. This section allows setting aside tax deeds period when (1)
the land had not been subject to taxation for the alleged period, (2) the taxes were
timely paid, (3) the land had not been assessed, (4) the land was timely redeemed,
(5) a proper certificate for payment or redemption had been timely presented, or
(6) the deed had been dated before the end of the redemption period.
15. See RSMO § 140.590 (1978). This section also contains a tolling provision for infancy and incompetency. Oddly, this statute of limitations is, by its
terms, not applicable to actions brought on the first, second, and fourth grounds
listed in § 140.610. See note 14 supra. Much has been written about the range of
application and rather curious history of § 140.590. See Eastin, Taxation, The
Work of the MissouriSupreme Courtfor the Year 1951, 17 Mo. L. REV. 369, 410
(1952); Eckhardt, Property, The Work of the MissouriSupreme Courtfor 1953,
19 Mo. L. REV. 297, 339 (1954); Eckhardt, Property, The Work of the Missouri
Supreme Courtfor 1951, 17 Mo. L. REV. 369, 402 (1952); Weathers, Taxationin
Missouri,25 Mo. L. REV. 398, 401 (1960); Comment, Tax Deeds Void on Their
Face and the Three Year Statute of Limitations, 20 Mo. L. REV. 87, 96-98
(1955).
16. RSMO §§ 140.230, .280 (1978). For a brief comparative study of tax
foreclosure procedures in various jurisdictions, see Note, Revenue and Taxation- Collection ofDelinquentReal Estate Taxes-LegislatingProtectionof the
Delinquent Property Owner in an Era of Super-Marketable Tax Titles, 19 DE
PAUL L. REV. 348, 359-75 (1969).

17. 559 S.W.2d at 195.
18. "The only effective means to protect the interests involved is simply to
Published
by University
of Missouri
Law Scholarship Repository, 1979
. . . ."of Id.
enforce
the law as
writtenSchool
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court rejected a policy and a rule which were first applied tojones-Munger
sales in Bussen Realty Co. v. Benson. 19 In Bussen, aJones-Munger sale for
less than one percent of actual value was set aside on the grounds of inadequacy of consideration. Prior cases had applied a similar rule, speaking
of inadequacy "so gross as to shock the conscience," 20 or of "so gross a
nature as to amount in itself to conclusive and decisive evidence of
fraud." 2' The language of fraud, which pervaded the history of this rule,
provided a persuasive legal idiom for describing the wrong to be righted.
But substantively, of course, "fraud" here meant nothing more than that
22
the price paid was unconscionably low.
Whatever its theoretical justification, the Bussen rule was at first applied only to invalidate sales to private purchases. But the rule was subsequently expanded in Costello v. City of St. Louis23 and Pettusv. City of St.
Louis24 to allow invalidation of sales to the governmental trustee. The rule
attained its final form with the addition of a theory which was apparently
first suggested in Liese v. Sackbauer2 5 and then clearly enunciated in
Costello26 and Pettus.27 These cases held that when gross inadequacy of
consideration is apparent from recitals on the face of a collector's deed, the
deed is void on its face and the three-year statute of limitations never
begins to run.
The criticisms which led the Powell court to overrule Bussen and its
progeny are founded in the relationship between landowner's remedies
and tax title marketability. 28 Basically, every ground which the law provides the owner for setting aside the sale is a potential "equity of rescission"
directly diminishing the purchaser's title. The resultant chilling effect on
19.
20.

349 Mo. 58, 159 S.W.2d 813 (En Banc 1942).
Mangold v. Bacon, 237 Mo. 496, 520, 141 S.W. 650, 656 (En Banc

1911).
21. Ellis v. Powell, 117 S.W.2d 225, 226 (Mo. 1938).
22. See Bussen Realty Co. v. Benson, 349 Mo. 58, 64, 159 S.W.2d 813, 816
(En Banc 1942).
23. 262 S.W.2d 591 (Mo. 1953).
24. 328 S.W.2d 636 (Mo. 1959).
25. 222 S.W.2d 84, 86 (Mo. 1949).
26. 262 S.W.2d at 596.
27. 328 S.W.2d at 639.
28. The problem is not that the purchaser is likely to lose his
investment,because the former owner must reimburse the deed holder upon
redemption. RSMO § 140.600 (1078). Rather, the collector's deed is simply worthless unless there is some chance that someone will eventually purchase through the
deed for use or occupation, or that the purchaser himself will use and occupy. Obviously, occupiers of land need more than a good calculated risk, particularly if
they are to make improvements. They need some reasonable assurances of
peaceable enjoyment of the land. It is the likelihood of being able to convert the
tax deed into a fairly marketable title, and the expense thereof, which the
original purchaser must estimate. It is difficult to believe the Bussen court's claim
of providing "reasonable protection" to the "purchaser who buys land-at a tax sale
for occupation." 159 S.W.2d at 819.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss4/12
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tax sale bidding is inevitable. The prudent buyer notices that his purchase
may later be invalidated because (among other reasons) the land had not
been assessed for taxes for the alleged period of delinquency. Estimating
the likelihood of a lawsuit on this ground and his probable success in such a
suit, the reasonable prospective buyer will discount the fair market value
of the land and limit his bid accordingly. Alternatively, he might investigate to assure himself that the sale is valid in this respect, but he will
no doubt discount the market value by the cost of the investigation (which
will not be recouped unless he is the successful bidder), plus the cost of prosecuting a successful suit to quiet title. Obviously, any reasonable subsequent purchaser will make comparable rough calculations and discounts,
and will bargain accordingly. Each other right of redemption or other
remedy available to the landowner has a corresponding depressing effect
on the bids at a tax sale.
Moreover, when one of the rights afforded the landowner is to set aside
the sale because of inadequate consideration, as was true under the Bussen
rule, the depressing effects of the remedy can produce a chain reaction.
The purchaser further discounts his bid because of the possibility of attack
grounded on inadequacy, and consequently the land is sold for less. Lower
sale prices in turn make a stronger case for inadequacy, which by the same
process drives prices still lower. Eventually it becomes difficult to get bids
large enough even to pay the back taxes, thus yielding no surplus proceeds
to compensate the owner, however inadequately, for his loss.
The Bussen rule was clearly motivated by the best intentions -to protect landowners from confiscation and to afford a remedy against such
confiscation. 29 Yet, in a sense, that purpose was frustrated by the effect
that the Bussen rule had on tax sale bidding.
In rejecting the inadequacy rule the Powell court was less concerned
with protecting landowners than with improving tax collection. In this
respect, the Bussen rule, in its original form, was not totally objectionable.
It was still possible for the taxing authority's trustee to acquire the land at
the third sale and subsequently sell the land to cover the tax debt without
threat of the deed being set aside solely on the grounds of inadequacy of
consideration. But with the extension of the inadequacy rule to cover
trustee purchases in Costello and Pettus, this resort for tax collection was
eliminated. Since theJones-Munger law prohibits the trustee from bidding
in excess of the sum of taxes, interest, penalties, and costs - an amount that
seldom exceeds ten percent of the land's actual value -the trustee could
never make a bid for other than a clearly inadequate amount.3 0 Hence, the
29. Powell v. County of St. Louis, 559 S.W.2d 189, 191 (Mo. En Banc
1977). "We find no other expressed reason for this court's application of the rule
to tax cases than its refusal to permit property to be so sacrificed as to amount to
confiscation." Bussen Realty Co. v. Benson, 349 Mo. 58, 64, 159 S.W.2d 813, 816
(En Banc 1942).
30.by University
See Shaw
v. Armstong,
Published
of Missouri
School of 361
Law Scholarship
1979 851 (1951) (sale for
Mo. 648, Repository,
235 S.W.2d
about 13% voided); Moore v. Brigman, 355 Mo. 889, 198 S.W.2d 857 (1947)
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trustee was precluded from acquiring good title in most cases. 31 Due to the
inability to acquire from a trustee any better title than the trustee himself
has, it became difficult to find persons willing to purchase from the trustee
at prices adequate even to make the taxing authority whole.3 2 In sum, the
extension of the inadequacy rule in Costello and Pettus made the JonesMunger trustee provisions a "worthless authorization,"3 3 and greatly inhibited the successful collection of tax revenues.
Finally, tax collection through the use of Jones-Munger tax
sales became even more difficult with the application of the theory that a
tax deed disclosing inadequate consideration was void on its face. This
voidness theory dealt a final, almost fatal, blow to tax title marketability,
and thus, to tax collectability.3 4 Before Liese, Costello, and Pettus, the tax
sale purchaser could reckon that however frail his title might be because of
inadequate consideration when first acquired, it would become immune
to such an adverse claim at the end of the special three-year statute of
limitations period. 35 But the voidness theory, as applied by the courts,
prevented this three-year limitation period from running where the tax
deed recited an inadequate consideration. 3 6 With this stopgap removed, a
tax sale purchaser's title could only be perfected by adverse possession, requiring up to twenty-seven years, 37 or by a quiet-title suit.38 It is easy to imagine the further depressing effect which all of this had on tax sale bidding, the principal phenomenon under scrutiny in Powell.
The Powell rule seems sure to improve tax collection. If nothing else,
the revitalization of the trustee provisions of section 140.260 should promote this end. Without the prima facie invalidity imposed on his purchase
(implying that much below 25% would be unconscionable). One case, citing
eight other "relatively late cases selected at random," in which sales had been set
aside, found a range of 2.08% to 8.5%. Wieser v. Linhardt, 257 S.W.2d 689,
691 (Mo. 1953).
31. Powell v. County of St. Louis, 559 S.W.2d 189, 193 (Mo. En Banc
1977).
32. Id. at 193-94.
33. Id. at 194.
34. The voidness rule has been the subject of other criticisms as well. See
Comment, Tax Deeds Void on TheirFace and the Three Year Statute of Limitations, 20 MO. L. REv. 87, 97-98 (1955).
35. Even before Costello and Pettus, however, the § 140.590 limitation
period apparently would not have barred all claims. The statute is expressly inapplicable only to certain claims listed in §140.610. See note 15 supra. That it was
intended to apply to all other types of claims seems likely, but not certain.
36. See notes 25-27 and accompanying text supra.
37. See RSMO §§ 516.010-.090 (1978) which contain the usual statutes of
limitations for real actions. There is some serious question as to whether even 27
years is adequate to clearJones-Munger deeds for several reasons. Title Examination Standardsof the Missouri.Bar,27 J. Mo. B. 37, 43 (1970) (Standard 24 and
comment). In many cases there may be no actual possession to quality for adverse
possession.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss4/12
38. See Bussen Realty Co. v. Benson, 349 Mo. 58, 69, 159 S.W.2d 813, 819
(En Banc 1942); RSMO § 140.330 (1978).
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by the old rule, the trustee should be able to find more buyers willing to
pay enough at least to cover the taxes due. Since the delinquent taxes are
typically a small fraction of the land's actual value, the relatively modest
increase in marketability which may be safely predicted after Powell
should attract more of these buyers.
The likelihood that abolition of the Bussen rule will improve such tax
collectability should be sufficient justification 'for the Powell court's
holding; had it relied solely on this ratiofiale, the decision would hardly be
open to criticism. But the other rationale offered by the court to support its
holding, as well as its predictions as to the practical effects of the new rule,
seem more questionable.
Although the Powell court could have reached the same result by ruling that the Jones-Munger law was an exhaustive statement of the landowner's rights, it appears that the court refused to go that far. Instead,
the court seems to have found the statute exhaustive within a limited
sphere.3 9 The six grounds listed in Mo. Rev. Stat. section 140.610 for overturning Jones-Munger tax sales constitute the starting point under the
court's rationale. The Powell court suggested that any grounds not listed in
section 140.610 which are similar in nature to those specified in that
statute are eliminated as bases for setting asidejones-Munger tax sales and
deeds. Those grounds that are dissimilar to the grounds listed in section
140.610 are not precluded as available means for upsetting tax sales. Inadequacy of consideration, the court stated, is "similar in nature to those
grounds listed in § 140.610, ' 40 and therefore cannot be a basis for overturningJones-Munger tax sales. 4 Conversely, other bases for invalidating
tax deeds, such as actual fraud, are not similar to the listed grounds and
42
remain actionable.
Whatever legal theory buttresses the change, elimination of the inadequacy rule was intended by the Powell court to lead to higher bidding by
making tax sales more attractive to buyers. In fact, the court in Powell
seemed to believe that tax sales would become much more attractive as a
result of its abrogation of the inadequacy rule:
Thus, the prudent purchaser who satisfies himself that the sale is
regular in all other respects may be confident that he is receiving a
39. RSMo § 140.610 (1978) appears to be exclusive, but other provisions,
such as §§ 140.330 and 140.570, clearly contemplate actions on other grounds.
40. 559 S.W.2d at 196.
41. Id. See note 14 supra.
42. This distinction is puzzling, and the criterion of "similarity" employed
obscure. The court quoted Bussen for the proposition that § 140.610 is not concerned with "a sale which is void because of the manner in which it is conducted,"
559 S.W.2d at 196, quoting 159 S.W.2d at 818. But it is not clear whether it accepted this as the test for dissimilarity. If it did, the same test yielded opposite
results in the two cases. Cf. Comment, Mortgages-Redemption after
Published
by University
School
Law L.
Scholarship
Repository,
1979
Foreclosure
SaleofinMissouri
Missouri,
25 ofMO.
REV. 261
(1960) (discussing
related questions regarding grounds for redemptions after deed of trust foreclosure).
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fully marketable title. With this element of uncertainty removed,
is a bargain, and more bidany price up to the fair market value
43
ders and higher prices are likely.
This view seems a bit too optimistic. It is no doubt likely that higher
bids will follow from the abolition of the inadequacy rule and the consequent lessening of the danger of litigation and invalidation which it
represented. It is still unrealistic to think that this one change will cause
bids to approach the full market value of the land. It is hardly to be expected that a forced sale will ever bring as high a price as would a freely
negotiated sale. More significantly, the "element of uncertainty" of which
the court speaks, although diminished somewhat, has not yet been purged. Other grounds for setting aside tax sales remain, such as defects in the
deed 4 4 or notice of sale. 45 From these follow inexorably less marketable
titles and depressed tax sale bidding. Satisfying oneself of the complete
regularity of the sale in all these respects may prove no easy matter. Some
fatal defects, as for example incomplete or statutorily insufficient recitals
on the deed form, may be readily ascertainable by the purchaser (assuming that he is well-versed in the relevant law). On the other hand, defects
involving extrinsic irregularities may require considerable investigation to
uncover, and even then do not always lend themselves to certainty. For instance, it would seem that an actual title search would be necessary in
order to determine whether the Missouri constitutional notice provisions 45
had been complied with. The prudent purchaser would be well advised to
consider seriously all of these .remaining uncertainties before relying on the
Powell court's promise of a bargain at "any price up to the fair market
value."
Increased sale prices in excess of the tax debt would also result
in
greater surplus proceeds to the owner. It is on the basis of this projection
that the Powell rule was claimed by the court to be more beneficial to
delinquent landowners than was the Bussen rule. 47 There is something
deceptive, though, in saying that this likely effect of the Powell rule will
work to the landowner's benefit. The dynamics of owner's remedies and
tax title marketability indicate that the loss which the owner suffers due to
43. 559 S.W.2d at 195.
44. See, e.g., Klorner v. Nunn, 318 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. 1958) (not witnessed
by county clerk); Jamison v. Galloway, 254 S.W. 101 (Mo. 1923) (failure to recite
that sale was for taxes); Loring v. Groomer, 142 Mo. 1, 43 S.W. 647 (1897)
(failure to state that statutory requirements were complied with); Heppler v.
Esther, 534 S.W.2d 533 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1976) (deed void for failure to recite
years of delinquency even though these were inferable from face of deed).
45. E.g., Mitchell v. Atherton, 563 S.W.2d 13 (Mo. En Banc 1978) (name of
record owner not in notice in violation of MO.CONST. art. 10, § 13 (1945); State ex
rel. Hartley v. Innes, 137 Mo. App. 420, 118 S.W. 1168 (St. L. Mo. App. 1909).
The constitutional validity of notice by publication in such cases is not yet fully
resolved. See note 2 supra.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss4/12
46. See note 7 supra.
47. 559 S.W.2d at 195.
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depressed sale prices is largely attributable to the rights of redemption
which he retains. The notion that Powell is doing the landowner a favor,
carried to its logical conclusion, would lead to a rule maximizing the
benefit by eliminating all of his grounds for attacking sales. 48 Such a rule
would certainly increase the value of tax titles and the owner would reap
the benefit of this increase in the form of additional surplus proceeds. Obviously, this would not be unequivocally beneficial. Whatever the rule, the
forced sale of land for payment of delinquent taxes will retain a disturbing49
ly confiscatory flavor.
The court's ruling undoubtedly will lead to improved tax collection
and may have a significant effect on the parties to tax sales-the landowner, the tax sale purchaser (private buyer or trustee), and the taxing
authority.
Powell may also carry implications for other interests, such as those of
the subsequent purchaser and his title examiner or title insurer. Language
in Powell would indicate an impression of the court that elimination of the
Bussen rule will suddenly render marketable titles which would have been
unmarketable under that former rule. A title examiner or insurer would
be well advised to ignore this suggestion of full marketability. At best, the
new rule merely gives the tax deed holder a somewhat better chance in
litigation. The title examiner's assurance of marketability means not that
the purchaser will prevail in a real dispute over ownership, but rather that
48. Something comparable, though less extreme, is effected by ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 120, § 747 (1973), which bars collateral attack in general on tax sale
proceedings. This has evidently enhanced marketability and deterred delinquency dramatically. There is no corresponding benefit to the landowner, however,
because of other provisions strictly limiting the amount of bids. The Illinois
statute is an example of an unusually, and perhaps unnecessarily, harsh tax
foreclosure law. See Turano, Equitable Relief, CollateralAttack and the Illinois
Tax Deed, 51 CHI-KENT L. REV. 725 (1975); Note, Revenue and Taxation- Collection of Delinquent Real Estate Tax-Legislating Protectionof the
Delinquent Property Owner in an Era of Super-Marketable Tax Titles, 19 DE
PAUL L. REV. 348 (1969).

49. With equitable relief from tax sales solely for inadequate consideration
barred by Powell, deprived landowners undoubtedly will search elsewhere for a
remedy. The confiscatory aspect of such actions by governmental agencies suggests the theory that such sales are an unconstitutional taking of private property
for public use without just compensation. U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV, § 1.
This theory twice has been urged against the Illinois tax lien foreclosure law, a
statute considerably harsher than the Jones-Munger law in this respect, but
without success. Catoor v. Blair, 358 F. Supp. 815 (N.D. Ill.), affd, 414 U.S. 990
(1973); Balthazar v. Mar Ltd., 301 F. Supp. 103 (N.D. Ill.), affd, 396 U.S.114
(1969). See also Industrial Bank v. Sheve, 307 F. Supp. 98 (D.D.C. 1969). A different situation arises when a governmental body retains surplus proceeds from
the sale. An unconstitutional "taking" might result from a statute which
precludes the owner from recovering the surplus. Nelson v. New York, 352 U.S.
103,by110
(1956)of (dictum).
TheJones-Munger
law provides
Published
University
Missouri School
of Law Scholarship Repository,
1979 for such recovery. See
note 14 supra.
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no genuine controversy reasonably can be expected to arise.5 0 It will take
far more dramatic changes in the tax sale area than those effected by
Powell to justify such assurances about tax deeds.
The Powell court did remove inadequacy of consideration as a sole
ground for defeating a tax sale and deed. But, as long as the former landowner is afforded some grounds for redemption, the possibility of a genuine dispute exists and is a continual cloud on title. 51 Actual fraud as an
available theory for setting aside tax sales and deeds was expressly left intact by the Powell court. 52 The same is true of the grounds listed in the
Jones-Munger law, 53 such as claims that the land had not been subject to
taxation for the alleged period5 4 or had not been assessed. 55 Technically
inadequate recitals on the face of the deed5 6 or defects in the notice of
sale57 apparently also remain available as grounds for overturning a sale.
In addition, there have been Missouri cases in which inadequacy of
consideration was merely one factor, along with other irregularities, which
contributed to a finding of invalidity. 58 It is not clear to what extent the
result in such situations would be different under Powell, which involved
inadequacy alone. Likewise, the theory of deeds void on their face, though
overruled in Powell with respect to recitals of consideration, would
presumably remain applicable to recitals of others types.59 If so, the special
three-year statute of limitations period may be ineffective against such
claims even after the Powell decision; the length of time necessary to
perfect Jones-Munger tax titles by adverse possession may therefore not be
shortened by Powell.
Finally, there remains after Powell a degree of uncertainty concerning
grounds available for attacking tax sales. The unpredictable manner in

50. See Thomas J. Johnson & Co. v. Mueller, 356 Mo. 1109, 1118, 205
S.W.2d 521, 527 (1947); Patzman v. Howey, 340 Mo. 11, 23, 100 S.W.2d 851,
857 (1936); Hartley v. Williams, 287 S.W.2d 129, 135 (Spr. Mo. App. 1956).
51. See cases cited note 50 supra.
52. See 559 S.W.2d at 196.
53. See id.
54. RSMo § 140.610 (1978).
55. Id.
56. See cases cited note 44 supra.
57. See cases cited note 45 supra.
58. See, e.g., Liese v. Sackbauer, 222 S.W.2d 84 (Mo. 1949) (inadequacy
plus misdescription of the land); State ex rel. Hartley v. Innes, 137 Mo. App. 420,
118 S.W. 1168 (St. L. 1909) (inadequacy plus defective notice).
59. See Klorner v. Nunn, 318 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. 1958) (not witnessed by
county clerk); Liese v. Sackbauer, 222 S.W.2d 84 (Mo. 1949) (misdescription);
Heppler v. Esther, 534 S.W.2d 533 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1976) (unfilled blank on
deed form). In connection with the voidness rule an important case is Hartley v.
Williams, 287 S.W.2d 129 (Spr. Mo. App. 1956), in which a land sale contract requiring that the vendor deliver marketable title was rescinded because of the
presence of a 12-year-old Jones-Munger deed in the chain of title.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss4/12
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which Missouri courts have responded to peculiar factual situations60 has
been a source of such uncertainty in the past, and this will not be lessened
by Powell. Further, this uncertainty may be compounded by ambiguities
arising from the court's theory that section 140.610 does not preclude suits
on grounds which, unlike inadequacy of consideration, are dissimilar to
those stated in the statute. The Powell court gives little guidance in determining what complaints are actionable under that theory, or for how long.
The court's reluctance to say anything more definite about the scope of
this statute constitutes another uncertainty beclouding tax titles after
Powell.
The above factors underscore the conclusion that title examiners
should attach little, if any, significance to the Powell decision. This is
especially true of the court's suggestion that tax titles will be fully
marketable now that the Bussen rule has been rejected.
With Powell, Missouri joined the majority of jurisdictions 61 in holding
that tax sales cannot be set aside solely because of inadequacy of consideration. The soundness of the policy behind this move is unquestioned in light
of the strong interest in revenue collection which it furthers, without imposing, in general, any great hardship on landowners. Beyond this, the
Powell court may promise more than it can deliver. Abolition of the inadequacy rule is certainly not a blessing for delinquent landowners and hardly
a panacea for weak tax titles. The Powell rule will shift the odds a little in
litigation, but anyone in the business of evaluating titles, other than for
speculation, should approach this decision with caution.
WILLIAM F. WEIGEL

60. See Modem Home Inv. Co. v. Boyle, 358 Mo. 1149, 219 S.W.2d 346
(1949) (sale was judicially confirmed after appraisal pursuant to § 141.580 of the
Land Tax Collection law, but later set aside upon showing that appraisers had
looked at wrong lot); Murphy v. Barron, 275 Mo. 282, 205 S.W. 49 (1918) (owner
in penitentiary at time of proceedings). A good, but unfortunately quite old collection of Missouri tax sale cases may be found in M. GILL, MISSOURI TAX
TITLES (1938). See also 3 M. GILL, REAL PROPERTY LAW IN MISSOURI 1161-94
(1949 & Supp. 1951).
61. See, e.g., Martin v. Jones, 268Ala. 286, 105So. 2d860(1958); Kavasv.
Berry, 167 N.E.2d 674 (Ohio App. 1960); Annot., 152 A.L.R. 887, 889-90
(1944). The issue is evidently seldom raised outside Missouri.
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